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Recently we've seen two reasons that the SCTs included in a final cert might not actually validate:
A GTS incident where they used the SCTs from the wrong precert
Our incident where the SCT signatures were calculated over different bytes (because the precert didn't match the final cert)
However, we have no lint that checks this. The certificate-transparency-go library checks that the SCTs returned by CT logs actually validate over the precert contents, but we don't have a check that they also validate over the final cert contents.
We should add a lint-like check which confirms this. It will need the CT log public keys in order to successfully validate the SCT signatures. zmap/zlint#728 may handle this for us, in which case this bug should track updating and enabling that lint.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
This idea came out of remediation for https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1838667
Recently we've seen two reasons that the SCTs included in a final cert might not actually validate:
However, we have no lint that checks this. The certificate-transparency-go library checks that the SCTs returned by CT logs actually validate over the precert contents, but we don't have a check that they also validate over the final cert contents.
We should add a lint-like check which confirms this. It will need the CT log public keys in order to successfully validate the SCT signatures. zmap/zlint#728 may handle this for us, in which case this bug should track updating and enabling that lint.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: