| 0 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Part-time (<50%) | 4.0 | Male | 20.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | No | No | NaN | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | I don't know | Always | No | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | NaN | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 1 | United Kingdom | 19.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Other | 9.0 | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Not important at all | Important | Important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Rarely | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 2 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Full-time | 4.0 | Male | NaN | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Important | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Important | Important | Important | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | I don't know | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 3 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Freelance | 0.0 | Male | NaN | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | No | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Not important at all | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | Yes | No | NaN | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | NaN | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 4 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Full-time | 3.0 | Male | 12.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Not important at all | Important | Not important at all | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | Yes | No | No | NaN | Yes, I have evidence | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 5 | United Kingdom | 3.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Other | 12.0 | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 6 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Female | 10.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | No | Yes | No | Not important at all | Slightly important | Not important at all | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Rarely | Yes | No | No | NaN | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 7 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Male | 5.0 | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | Yes | 5.0 | I don't know | Not helpful at all | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Important | Important | Somewhat important | Important | Important | Somewhat important | I don't know | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | I prefer not to say | I don't know | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | I don't know | No | I don't know | I don't know | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 8 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Male | 0.5 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | No knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | I don't know | Yes | No | Slightly important | Slightly important | Slightly important | Important | Slightly important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight is mostly effective, however its <br>institutional design needs reform for oversight practitioners to reliably <br>uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 9 | United Kingdom | 5.0 | Part-time (>50%) | NaN | Other | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 10 | United Kingdom | 11.0 | Full-time | NaN | Other | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 11 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Male | 5.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | Yes | 15.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Slightly important | Very important | Slightly important | Very important | Slightly important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Rarely | No | No | No | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 12 | United Kingdom | 23.0 | Freelance | 5.0 | Male | 20.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | NaN | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight is mostly effective, however its <br>institutional design needs reform for oversight practitioners to reliably <br>uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | NaN | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 13 | Germany | 16.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 4.0 | Other | 5.0 | Advanced knowledge | Expert knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | True | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 14 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Male | 4.0 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Expert knowledge | No funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | No | Yes | No | Slightly important | Slightly important | I prefer not to say | Very important | Somewhat important | Very important | Important | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | No | No | I don't know | I don't know | No | No | I don't know | I don't know | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 15 | Germany | 17.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Other | 7.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Expert knowledge | No funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | I prefer not to say | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 16 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 0.5 | Male | 40.0 | Some knowledge | Expert knowledge | Basic knowledge | Little funding | Yes | 5.0 | Yes, within 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Important | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Somewhat important | Slightly important | NaN | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Always | No | NaN | NaN | Yes | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are incompatible with democratic <br>values and should be abolished | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 17 | Germany | 3.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 3.0 | Other | 10.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 18 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 0.5 | Male | 10.0 | Expert knowledge | Expert knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Never | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 19 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 3.0 | Male | 8.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Basic knowledge | Sufficient funding | Yes | 5.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Not helpful at all | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Very important | Somewhat important | Very important | Important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | I don't know | Yes | Yes | NaN | Yes, I have evidence | No | NaN | No | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | Yes | No | Yes | I don't know | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | NaN | NaN | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 20 | Germany | 23.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 3.0 | Female | 5.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Slightly important | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | Important | I prefer not to say | Somewhat important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | Yes, I have evidence | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 21 | Germany | 3.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 1.0 | Other | 10.0 | Basic knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Basic knowledge | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 22 | Germany | 23.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 3.0 | Male | 6.0 | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | Yes | Yes | Yes | Important | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Important | Somewhat important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | Yes | No | I prefer not to say | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are incompatible with democratic <br>values and should be abolished | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 23 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Other | 10.0 | Expert knowledge | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | No | Yes | Yes | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | No | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | I don't know | No | No | No | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | NaN | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 24 | Germany | 23.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 2.0 | Male | 3.0 | Expert knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | Yes | Very important | Very important | Slightly important | Very important | Very important | Important | Very important | I have full confidence that the right tools <br>will protect my communication from surveillance | Rarely | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 25 | Germany | 5.0 | Full-time | 3.0 | Other | 15.0 | Advanced knowledge | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 26 | Germany | 17.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 4.0 | Other | 4.0 | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Basic knowledge | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | Important | Very important | I don't know | NaN | Very important | I don't know | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 27 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 4.0 | Female | 26.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Basic knowledge | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | No | Yes | Yes | Very important | Important | Somewhat important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | No | No | No | I don't know | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are incompatible with democratic <br>values and should be abolished | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 28 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Male | 3.0 | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | No funding | Yes | 20.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | I don't know | Very important | Very important | Somewhat important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | No | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are incompatible with democratic <br>values and should be abolished | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 29 | Germany | 23.0 | Freelance | 5.0 | Male | 6.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Slightly important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | No | No | No | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 30 | Germany | 23.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Female | 2.0 | Basic knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Basic knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Slightly important | I prefer not to say | Very important | Very important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Rarely | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | I don't know | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 31 | France | 23.0 | Full-time | 4.0 | Male | 6.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Sufficient funding | Yes | 1.0 | Yes, within 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Somewhat important | Very important | Important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | No | No | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | I don't know | No | I don't know | I don't know | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 32 | France | 23.0 | Other | 4.0 | Other | 7.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | NaN | I don't know | I don't know | No | I don't know | No | NaN | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | No | I don't know | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 33 | France | 18.0 | Full-time | 15.0 | Other | 25.0 | Some knowledge | Expert knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Not important at all | Slightly important | Not important at all | Slightly important | Important | Important | Not important at all | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | No | Yes | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 34 | France | 6.0 | Freelance | 15.0 | Other | 25.0 | Expert knowledge | Expert knowledge | Expert knowledge | No funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 35 | France | 23.0 | Full-time | 15.0 | Male | 25.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Not important at all | Slightly important | Not important at all | Slightly important | Slightly important | Important | Not important at all | I have no confidence in the protection offered by <br>technological tools | Often | No | No | No | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | NaN | NaN | No | No | Yes | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | Yes | No | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 36 | France | 4.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Other | 26.0 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | I don't know | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 37 | France | 18.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Other | 26.0 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | NaN | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil Society Scrutiny |
|---|
| 38 | United Kingdom | 18.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 3.0 | Male | 1.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Always | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | I don't know | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | I prefer not to say | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 39 | United Kingdom | 18.0 | Full-time | 4.0 | Male | 2.0 | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Slightly important | Important | Slightly important | Important | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Sometimes | No | Yes | I don't know | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | NaN | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 40 | United Kingdom | 6.0 | Freelance | 2.0 | Other | 4.0 | Some knowledge | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | No funding | Yes | 2.0 | Yes, within 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 41 | United Kingdom | 9.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Other | 20.0 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Basic knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | True | True | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 42 | United Kingdom | 8.0 | Full-time | 0.0 | Other | 10.0 | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | I don't know | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 43 | United Kingdom | 18.0 | Other | 0.0 | Other | NaN | No knowledge | No knowledge | Basic knowledge | I don't know | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Slightly important | Not important at all | Not important at all | Very important | Slightly important | Somewhat important | I don't know | I have no confidence in the protection offered by <br>technological tools | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | No | No | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | I prefer not to say | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 44 | United Kingdom | 18.0 | Full-time | 15.0 | Male | 2.0 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | Yes | 20.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Very helpful | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Important | Important | Slightly important | Very important | Important | Very important | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Rarely | Yes | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | NaN | NaN | Y | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 45 | United Kingdom | 17.0 | Full-time | 4.0 | Male | 15.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Very important | Important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 46 | United Kingdom | 18.0 | Full-time | 5.0 | Other | 10.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | I don't know | Yes | 3.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Not helpful at all | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 47 | Germany | 5.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Other | 12.0 | Advanced knowledge | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 48 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 10.0 | Female | 7.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some funding | Yes | 20.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Important | Somewhat important | Very important | Very important | Very important | I don't know | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | Yes | No | I don't know | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Audit courts | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 49 | Germany | 18.0 | Freelance | 2.0 | Other | 10.0 | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | No funding | Yes | 2.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Not helpful at all | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Important | Slightly important | Not important at all | Very important | Very important | Somewhat important | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Rarely | I don't know | NaN | NaN | NaN | Yes, I have evidence | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Yes | NaN | NaN | NaN | Yes | No | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Intelligence agencies are incompatible with democratic <br>values and should be abolished | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 50 | Germany | 18.0 | Freelance | 5.0 | Male | 4.0 | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | I don't know | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | I prefer not to say | No | No | I don't know | Yes, I suspect | Yes | I was threatened with prosecution | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are incompatible with democratic <br>values and should be abolished | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 51 | Germany | 18.0 | Part-time (>50%) | 1.0 | Male | 2.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | I prefer not to say | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | NaN | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Rarely | I prefer not to say | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 52 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Male | 15.0 | Advanced knowledge | Expert knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | Yes | 20.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Very important | Important | Important | Very important | Important | Very important | I try to avoid technology-based communication whenever <br>possible when I work on intelligence-related issues | Always | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | Yes | No | I don't know | I don't know | No | No | No | I don't know | No | No | No | No | I don't know | I don't know | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 53 | Germany | 12.0 | Full-time | 6.0 | Other | 5.0 | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | Yes | 3.0 | Yes, within 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | I prefer not to say | Slightly important | Important | Important | Very important | Important | Very important | I don't know | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | No | Yes | I don't know | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 54 | Germany | 6.0 | NaN | NaN | Other | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 55 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Male | 7.0 | No knowledge | Basic knowledge | Some knowledge | No funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | No | No | No | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 56 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 5.0 | Male | 35.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | Yes | Yes | Very important | Important | Somewhat important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 57 | Germany | 15.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Other | 5.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Basic knowledge | No funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Slightly important | Important | Somewhat important | Important | Slightly important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | I prefer not to say | Yes | I don't know | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 58 | Germany | 6.0 | Freelance | 2.0 | Other | 11.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 59 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 21.0 | Male | 20.0 | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | A great deal of funding | Yes | 2.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Somewhat important | Important | Slightly important | Very important | Very important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Often | Yes | Yes | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are a vital component of national <br>security and should be shielded from excessive bureaucratic <br>restrictions | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | Y | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 60 | Germany | 7.0 | NaN | NaN | Other | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 61 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 6.0 | Male | 14.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Basic knowledge | A great deal of funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | Yes | Somewhat important | Very important | NaN | Very important | Important | Very important | I don't know | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | No | Yes | Yes | I don't know | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 62 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 10.0 | Male | 10.0 | Advanced knowledge | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | A great deal of funding | Yes | 10.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | I prefer not to say | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | I prefer not to say | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | Yes, I suspect | Yes | I was threatened with prosecution | No | No | No | No | I don't know | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | NaN | No | Yes | NaN | No | No | I don't know | No | No | Yes | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 63 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 5.0 | Male | 7.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | True | True | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | Yes | Slightly important | Slightly important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | I prefer not to say | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 64 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 2.0 | Male | 20.0 | Expert knowledge | Expert knowledge | Some knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Not important at all | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Never | Yes | Yes | I don't know | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 65 | Germany | 18.0 | Freelance | 4.0 | Male | NaN | Expert knowledge | Expert knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Important | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Important | Important | Somewhat important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | No | No | No | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Civil society organisations | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 66 | Germany | 7.0 | Full-time | NaN | Other | 30.0 | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | No knowledge | Some funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 67 | Germany | 18.0 | Full-time | 5.0 | Male | 10.0 | Some knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Little funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | I prefer not to say | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Always | No | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | Yes, I have evidence | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | I prefer not to say | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 68 | France | 6.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Other | 12.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Basic knowledge | A great deal of funding | Yes | 2.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Helpful in parts | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 69 | France | 18.0 | Full-time | 10.0 | Male | 10.0 | Advanced knowledge | Some knowledge | Expert knowledge | I don't know | Yes | 2.0 | No, usually longer than 30 days | Not helpful at all | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Very important | Important | Very important | Very important | Very important | I don't know | Under the current conditions of communications <br>surveillance, technological solutions cannot offer <br>sufficient protection for the data I handle | Sometimes | No | I don't know | I don't know | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | NaN | No | No | Yes | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Effective intelligence oversight is a hopeless endeavour <br>and even a systematic reorganization is unlikely to ensure <br>misconduct is uncovered and prevented. | NaN | NaN | Y | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | Civil society organisations | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 70 | France | 18.0 | Full-time | 3.0 | Male | 10.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Some funding | Yes | 4.0 | Never | Not helpful at all | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Important | Important | Very important | Very important | Very important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Always | No | Yes | Yes | NaN | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | I don't know | No | No | Yes | Yes | I prefer not to say | I prefer not to say | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | Civil society organisations | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Judicial oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Audit courts | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Audit courts | Data protection authorities | Independent expert bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 71 | France | 18.0 | Full-time | 1.0 | Male | 5.0 | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | Basic knowledge | No funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Important | Important | Slightly important | Very important | Important | Important | I don't know | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | I don't know | No | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Intelligence agencies contradict democratic principles,<br>and their powers should be kept at a bare minimum | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | Independent expert bodies | NaN | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | Data protection authorities | Parliamentary oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | Judicial oversight bodies | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 72 | France | 10.0 | Freelance | NaN | Other | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 73 | France | 18.0 | Full-time | 7.0 | Male | 8.0 | Some knowledge | Some knowledge | Basic knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | No | Yes | No | Somewhat important | Slightly important | Slightly important | Very important | Important | Important | NaN | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Sometimes | Yes | No | Yes | NaN | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | NaN | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight lacks efficacy, hence a fundamental <br>reorganization of oversight capacity is needed for oversight practitioners <br>to reliably uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|
| 74 | France | 18.0 | Freelance | 10.0 | Male | 22.0 | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Advanced knowledge | Sufficient funding | No | NaN | NaN | NaN | False | True | False | False | False | False | False | False | False | Yes | Yes | No | Very important | Slightly important | Very important | NaN | Very important | Very important | Very important | Technological tools help to protect my identity <br>to some extent, but an attacker with sufficient power <br>may eventually be able to bypass my technological <br>safeguards | Rarely | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes, I suspect | No | NaN | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | I don't know | Yes | I don't know | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Intelligence agencies are necessary and legitimate institutions <br>of democratic states, even though they may sometimes overstep <br>their legal mandates | Intelligence oversight is mostly effective, however its <br>institutional design needs reform for oversight practitioners to reliably <br>uncover past misconduct and prevent future misconduct | Y | NaN | NaN | Y | NaN | NaN | NaN | Parliamentary oversight bodies | Independent expert bodies | Data protection authorities | Audit courts | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Civil society organisations | Judicial oversight bodies | NaN | NaN | NaN | Independent expert bodies | Judicial oversight bodies | Civil society organisations | NaN | NaN | NaN | Media Scrutiny |
|---|